Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Elizabeth Andrus v. Daniel Andrus : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent Young; Ivie & Young; Attorney for Appellee.
Rosemond Blakelock; Young, Kester & Petro; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Andrus v. Andrus, No. 20060351 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6439

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

ORIGINAL
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELIZABETH ANDRUS,
Petitioner/Appellee,

) APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH
) JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
) UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTA

vs.

)
)

DANIEL ANDRUS,

) Trial Court Judge: James R. Taylor
)

) Trial Court No. 974402454
)

Respondent/Appellant.

) Appellate Court No. 20060351
)

) Priority 15
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Brent Young
Ivie and Young
226 West 2230 North
Suite 210
Provo, Utah 84603

Rosemond Blakelock
Young, Kester and Petro
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84603

Attorney for Appellee,
Elizabeth Andrus

Attorney for Appellant,
Daniel Andrus

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

FILED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELIZABETH ANDRUS,
Petitioner/Appellee,

) APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH
) JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
) UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAI

vs.

)
)

DANIEL ANDRUS,

) Trial Court Judge: James R. Taylor
)

) Trial Court No. 974402454
)

Respondent/Appellant.

) Appellate Court No. 20060351
)

) Priority 15
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Brent Young
Ivie and Young
226 West 2230 North
Suite 210
Provo, Utah 84603

Rosemond Blakelock
Young, Kester and Petro
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84603

Attorney for Appellee,
Elizabeth Andrus

Attorney for Appellant,
Daniel Andrus

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Date 2j&

UTAH SUPREME COURT/UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Case JNO.Q<C^ * ^

CHECKLIST FOR BRIEFS
RECORD HAS BEEN RETURNED.
i ^ T I M E L Y FILING OF BRIEF
An untimely brief may be rejected under Rule 27(e). If a brief is untimely, a motion under Rule 2(
ill be mandatory for permission to file a late brief.
CORRECT NUMBER OF COPIES
1.
Supreme Court:
10 copies, one containing original signature
/I.
Court of Appeals:
^^Sj^opies, one containing original signature
\ / LENGTH
(Excluding Addendum)
1.
Appellant, Appellee/Cross-appellant:
50 pages
2.
Appellant/Cross-appellee Reply:
25 pages
3.
Appellee/Cross-appellant Reply:
/ ^ 2 5 pages__3
4.
Guardian ad Litem or Intervenor:
50 pages
/S.
Amicus Curiae
No Limit
V SIZE AND BINDING
J ^ P R I N T I N G REQUIREMENTS
1.
Proportionally spaced typeface must be 13-point or larger for both text and Footnotes; mo
spaced typeface may not contain more than 10 characters per inch.
Print on both sides of the page.
Double-spaced; 1 Vi spacing is unacceptable.
1" margin on all sides
COVER REQUIREMENTS
__
Color: Appellant:
Blue Appellant/Cross-appellee Reply:/Graj^
Appellee/Cross-appellant:
Red
Appellee/Cross-appellant Reply: Gray
Amicus, Intervenor, Guardian: Green
Name of counsel and parties represented
a.
Counsel filing brief on lower right
b.
Opposing counsel on lower left
CONTENT REQUIREMENTS - IN ORDER STATED
1st of all parties
able of Contents with page references
Table of Authorities
//I/

Jurisdictional Statement (Mandatory for Appellant)

/////^Statement of Issues & Standard of Review (Mandatory for Appellant)
1.
2J
V|

Citation to record showing issue preserved in Trial court; or
Statement of grounds for seeking review of issue not preserved in Trial Court

Constitutional or Statutory Provisions

M //^Statement of Case (Mandatory for Appellant)
\/

tatement of Facts
ummary of Argument
Argument
Conclusion
f o A n n c p l nf r-p>nnrr\ fYR n a r t v i f P m SiP

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMERY OF THE APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE ONE

•

ISSUE TWO

'

ISSUE THREE

S

ISSUE FOUR

1.

ISSUE FIVE

V

CONCLUSION

1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Oneida/SLC v. Oneida cold Storage and Warehouse
872P.2d 1052 (Utah App. Ct. 1994)
Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, If 30, 9 P.3d 171
ADDENDUM
Addendum A

]

Addendum B

]

SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT
The Appellee contends that, regarding the five issue presented by the Appellant,
that he failed to marshal the evidence and therefore, his appeal must fail.
This responsive Brief addresses that argument.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The Appellee cites to Oneida /SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehousi
872 P.2d 1052 (Utah App. 1994) and states that the burden of marshaling evidenc
is on the Appellant.
That is correct. In Oneida the Utah Court of Appeals stated that an
Appellant cannot present "carefully selected" facts. Additionally, the Utah Court
of appeals set forth a two-tier test and stated that "Successful challenges to the
findings of fact thus must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the trial court
found the facts from the evidence and second why such findings contradict the
weight of the evidence." Id. At 1053.
The Appellant believes that he did marshal the evidence. He set forth both
"how" the trial found the facts and then he stated "why" the findings contradict th
weight of the evidence.
This reply Brief shall rebut the assertion that the Appellant did not
marshal.

ISSUE 1
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by assuming that Paragraph 13 of

Decree of Divorce included stock options that had not yet been awarded to the
Appellant at the time of the Decree of Divorce?
The first issue presented in the brief of Appellant was regarding paragn
13 of the Decree of Divorce., which states "The Respondent has qualified for
certain stock options through his place of employment, Novell, Inc. The Petitio
is awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of said stock options that the respondent
acquired, or is entitled to, or which he has acquired all rights in through his pla
of employment which have accumulated as of the date of this Stipulation."
The stipulation was signed by the parties on November 11, 1997.
Therefore, the Decree, at paragraph 13, limits the division of stock optic
to those that existed on November 11, 1999.
Appellant contended that court abused its discretion when it awarded
a judgment to Elizabeth Andrus for stocks that did not exist on November 11,
1999.
HOW: In his Brief, the Appellant set forth how the trial court awarded 1
judgment to Elizabeth Andrus.
The evidence marshaled was the cite to CR1573; lines 7-9. The trial coi

found that the parties "anticipated" that there would be 55,400 share of stock to
divide.
HOW: At trial there was one piece of evidence that contained the number
"55,400." Appellant marshaled the evidence in his brief, with his "Addendum F"
which he identified as "Exhibit 1, tab O." That document was a copy of an e-mail
which Daniel Andrus sent to Elizabeth Andrus' family members, "Alva and
Jared." Exhibit 1, tab O was a document that was never sent to Elizabeth Andrus.
It was admitted at trial. Although Mr. Andrus did not believe that it was relevant
because it was not even sent to Elizabeth Andrus and the document was inaccuratt
and also inadmissable because it was the product of negotiations, it was used by
the Court as the basis for the determination of the number of stock options.
Because the Court used the document and relied on the document, it was
marshaled by Daniel Andrus.
The Appellant had no other document to produce in his appeal as evidence
that the Court relied upon. Pursuant to Oneida, at page 1053, Mr. Andrus was
obligated to present "every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which
supports the very findings the appellant resists."
The Appellee's brief at page 7 acknowledges that Appellant did marshal
exhibit lo . However, she contends that exhibits "lm or Ik" were not marshaled
and she implies that the two pieces of evidence support the ruling of the trial court

But, the Appellee does not attach the exhibits to her brief, nor does not say how
the exhibits she cites support the Court's rulings.
Exhibit 1L is a letter written by attorney Guy Black and it discusses the
9,000 shares of stock that Mrs. Andrus was paid for. It does not discuss the
55,400 shares. See attachment A of this brief.
Exhibit 1L address stocks that were later exchanged and blacked out. Th
date of the document is July 15, 1997. The exhibits cited by Appellee are not
relevant to any decision made by the Court because the written stipulation and
Decree of Divorce refer to stock that existed on November 11, 1997, which was
the date the Stipulation was signed. Any stock that existed months prior to the
date of November 11, 1999 were, pursuant to the terms of the parties written
stipulation, not relevant. See attachment B of this brief.
Both exhibits are attached to this responsive brief. But neither exhibit
could have been one which the trial court relied upon because the letter does nc
mention the number 55,400 shares and the other document is dated and signed
months before the November 11, 1999 date the parties stipulation was effective
Appellant marshaled evidence regarding the date the stipulation was sigi
and marshaled a letter from Novel setting forth the number of shares that existe
on the date the stipulation was signed.
Dan Andrus did not agree with the trial court that there were 55,400 sha

of stock available to divide at the date of November 11, 1999. However, the
Appellant did marshal the evidence in that regard. It was the only evidence
submitted with the the number of shares the trial court addressed at trial.
HOW: The Decree of Divorce, at paragraph 13 did not set forth a number
of stock options which should be divided by the parties. The only document that
was produced at trial that contained the number 55,400 was marshaled by the
Appellant..
WHY: In his brief, the Appellant cited "why" the findings contradict the
weight of the evidence and in doing that he attached two documents to his brief.
The first evidence cited was Addendum G, (which was exhibit number 31,
attachment 1) which was a letter from the Novell Director os Shareholder Service:
who wrote Daniel Andrus a letter dated May 10, 2004 and it stated "In reference t
your stock options as of November, 1997; You had only 9,000 options that were
exercisable. All other option that you held in November 1997 were in a black-out
period and unexercisable due to the terms under the repriced program."
On November 11, 1999 there were 9,000 stock options in existence and
Daniel Andrus marshaled any and all evidence presented at trial that verified that
fact.
In addition, the Appellant attached Petitioner's exhibit 20, as addendum H,
which set forth the Stock Option History. The marshaling of "evidence" both as
to How and Why was accomplished by Mr. Andrus and attached to his brief. The

Utah Court of Appeals need not look or search for any additional evidence in th
file because the evidence that supported the Courts findings were attached as w«
as the evidence that disputed the trail Court's findings. It is true that the Appell
need not search for the evidence and provide it. The marshaling was done by tt
Appellant.

ISSUE TWO
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it created a method to assi
a value to the stock options which were then awarded to the Appellee?
The Appellant explained, in his brief, that the trial court found that the
value of the stock should be determined by taking the average value of the stocl
nine different time that Mrs. Andrus had requested the stock options.
HOW: Regarding evidence which supported the trial court's valuation c
the stock options, Daniel Andrus attached the evidence which supported the bai
for the trial court's valuation of the stocks. See Appellant's brief, addendum I,
which was Elizabeth Andrus submission of exhibit 21. Daniel Andrus also
submitted in his brief, Addendum H, which was the exhibit 20, submitted by
Elizabeth Andrus, which was the list of the stock option personal summary.
The Appellant attached to his brief, Addendum B, which was the writter
stipulation signed by both Elizabeth and Daniel Andrus, on November 11, 199'
The Annellant noted in his brief, that the award of stock options to

Elizabeth Andrus was the number that had accumulated "as of the date of this
stipulation." See addendum B, paragraph 14.
The Appellant did not contend that the court came up with the values for
stocks from the air. The Appellant stated in his brief that Elizabeth Andrus
testified that she asked for the stock options at different times and the Court founc
that it should average the value of the stocks at various times. The Court was
provided with exhibit number 21, as a tool to value the stock options. Daniel
Andrus cited to the exhibit and attached it when he accomplished the marshaling
as to the issue of stock valuation.
The Appellant agrees with the Appellee that paragraph 37 of the Findings
of the trial Court provides (amount other things) that "the Decree [of Divorce]
specified 55,400 shares, 9000 of which were divided."
However, neither the written stipulation, which was signed on November
11, 1999, nor the resulting Decree of Divorce contained the language that the tria
court stated it did.
No amount of marshaling can support a finding that does not exist or
provide rationale to language that is not contained in the court documents. The
number "55,400 shares" [of stock] is not in the written, signed stipulation and it is
not in the Decree of Divorce. Any document that referred, or even mentioned,
that number was marshaled and discussed by Daniel Andrus.

Daniel Andrus also marshaled the evidence, when he attached Addendur
E, which was the Decree of Divorce at paragraph 13 that dealt with stocks. The
is no number "55,400" in the Divorce Decree, as the trial court stated in it's
findings, at paragraph 37.
There is no marshaling that can accomplish prove a fact that does not ex
ISSUE THREE
3.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it chose to apply Paragraph <

the Decree of Divorce, when the issue of Alimony had been reserved for trial?
Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce, attached to the brief of Daniel
Andrus states; "The Court finds that it is anticipated that the Petitioner may obt
employment outside the home. In the even she should obtain full time
employment, the same shall not affect the amount of child support or alimony t
be paid by the respondent to the petitioner."
HOW: The evidence marshaled was noted in the brief of Daniel Andrus
page 24, where he referred to the CR:1682, line 1 paragraph 15, where the coui
noted "As noted above the parties stipulated and agreed that the Petitioner's ou
the home income would not be considered in determining spouse support."
The basis of the Court's ruling was the reliance on that portion of the Decree al
paragraph 6. That was the entirety of the Court refusal to consider the Petitione
income when calculating alimony and child support.
The marshaling that was necessary was to find out what evidence the co

relied upon and say so. The Appellant marshaled the information necessary for
the Utah Court of Appeals to understand the basis for the Court's ruling.

Daniel Andrus marshaled the findings and evidence that the Court found
that the parties written stipulation, and paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce, was
the basis of the award.
Daniel Andrus then marshaled, attached and discussed the written
stipulation and it's application by the Court to the issue of alimony.
WHY: Also marshaled was the original ruling by Judge Ray M. Harding Jr
where at CR: 0129, this document was attached as Addendum K, to the brief of
Daniel Andrus. The ruling of the Court stated that "Respondent is entitled to reliel
from the stipulation and the Divorce Decree in regards to alimony and child
support provisions which were calculated from the mistaken income figures.
Therefore, the Court finds that justice would be furthered by relieving the
Respondent from his stipulation on the provisions of alimony and child support
only.55
Daniel Andrus also marshaled and attached Addendum L, which was page:
from the Affidavit of Daniel Andrus in Support of his Motion to Set Aside the
Decree of Divorce, wherein at paragraph 9 that the original stipulation and
resulting Decree of Divorce was based upon a misunderstanding by Daniel Andruj

regarding the impact his (then) wife's income would have on his child support
obligation.
Regarding the issue of marshaling to the discussion of alimony, there are
two basic documents that were presented as evidence to the trial court. The first
paragraph 6, which was not set aside and it was attached in the brief of Daniel
Andrus. The second piece of evidence was the ruling of Judge Ray Harding, Jr.
which was attached in the brief of Daniel Andrus.
The Appellee implies that Daniel Andrus attempted to reargue the case. {
Appellee's brief at page 12, "this is not a forum for reargument of this case."
Appellant never tried to reargue the case in his brief. He stated what evidence
supported the trial court and then Dan Andrus set forth why the court's findings
contradict the evidence. Dan Andrus marshaled the evidence, regarding prior cc
rulings and orders. He then cited to case law that supported the long held
contention that the actual income of Elizabeth should not have been ignored by
Court.
Paragraph 18 of the Findings of the trial court find: "Although her incon
will not be used as part of these calculations the Petitioner is employed and
employable." Daniel Andrus did not disagree with the fact that the Petitioner is
employed and is employable.
The argument of Daniel Andrus was that the finding by the trial court th
the income of Elizabeth Andrus would not be considered for the purposes of

alimony and child support was not supported by the evidence he presented and
marshaled, via attachments to his brief. When Daniel Andrus cited to prior
rulings of the Court and attached the evidence he relied upon. He also cited to the
court record that would support the Court's decision on that issue. The evidence
that supports the Court's ruling was paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce and the
evidence that supported the Appellants position was marshaled and attached, as
previously discussed above.
ISSUE FOUR
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to consider the

Respondent's tax obligations, and as a result did not correctly compute his net
available income in determining Alimony?
HOW: Daniel Andrus had very little evidence that he could marshal
regarding the Court's ignoring the tax obligations of the Appellant. The Court did
not even consider the net income of Daniel Andrus.
The Court acknowledged that it used the gross income of Daniel Andrus in
it's findings, where at paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact (CR: 1683) state "the
Respondent's unchallenged position is that gross income for 2005 and in the
future should be considered as $10,000.00 per month." Therefore, there was no
evidence that could be marshaled regarding a stipulated fact.
It was a gross income that, as the court stated, was stipulated by the parties

and adopted by the trial court. Because the stipulation of the parties was adopte
by the trial court, there is no evidence to marshal that would require additional
support. The Court correctly stated that stipulation. There is nothing to marshal
that would dispute or disprove that fact.
WHY: Daniel Andrus marshaled all the evidence that indicated that the
trial court's analysis failed to consider the weight of the evidence. The Appellar
cited and marshaled testimony - even from Elizabeth Andrus - that verified the 1
implications for Daniel Andrus on his gross income of $10,000.00 per month.
The evidence marshaled in that regard was as follows;
Daniel Andrus cited to the trial transcript, pages 35, 155, 272, 276, 411.
Specifically Daniel Andrus marshaled that Ms. Andrus testified to the
amount of income taxes Daniel pays each month during direct examination (tria
transcript, page 35):
MR. YOUNG: Now, does [Daniel's] paycheck show a net after tax figure?
MS. ANDRUS: Well, you take out the taxes, which total $3,410. So it gives hii
net after taxes, $6,558.
Daniel Andrus cited to Exhibit 33, as submitted by Daniel Andrus also si
forth the monthly tax obligations of Daniel Andrus, which he attached in his bri
as Addendum J, which indicates that Daniel spends a minimum of $2,599.00 pe
month in taxes.
The trial court conducted a very simple analysis, regarding the ability of

Daniel Andrus to pay alimony, wherein at paragraph 29 of the Findings, the trial
court found that Daniel's expenses should be considered to be $6,499.00. The
trial court arrived at that figure by allowing for $1,500.00 per month for housing,
$500.00 for food, $1,400.00 for child support, $316.00 for auto payments and
allowed $2,783.00 for all other misc. expenses for a total of $6,499.00 per month.
The trial court's findings at paragraph 30 then deducted the monthly expenses
from the gross income of $10,000.00.
Assuming that the Findings of the trial court are correct and that when it
found that the monthly expenses of Daniel Andrus were $6,499.00 (no challenge
has been made to that finding) and assuming that the trial court was correct when
it found, at paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact (CR: 1683) that "the Respondent9
unchallenged position is that gross income for 2005 and in the future should be
considered as $10,000.00 per month., then it cannot be also be accurate and true
that Daniel Andrus has $3,150.00 available to pay alimony .
Without attempting to reargue the case, Daniel Andrus marshaled the only
evidence available in the case, which was the findings of gross income, that were
the result of the stipulation of the parties and the court's analysis of the money
available to pay alimony.
ISSUE FIVE

5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered the Appellant to p;

the Appellee's attorney fees, after attempting to divide disposable income equal
The Appellant asked the question regarding the evidence which supported the
award of attorney's fees to Elizabeth Andrus. In addressing that issue the
Appellant contended that the "[T]he trial court must base [an award of attorney'
fees] on evidence of the receiving spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's
ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." and cited to Kelle
v. Kelley. 2000 UT App 236, f 30, 9 P.3d 171.
HOW: Daniel Andrus marshaled the evidence that supported the court's
award of alimony. He marshaled the following:
1. the statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8)(a).
2. The court assessed Daniel's gross income, calculated his disposable income a
found that he had enough "disposable income" per month.
3. The Court found that Elizabeth Andrus is without substantial cash.
Daniel Andrus did not ignore the findings or the evidence that supported the
findings of the court. He cited to the findings and then attempted to address his
issues.
WHY: Daniel disputed what the court considered to be his disposable
income and cited to the evidence that rebutted that - which was once again the
ignoring of the tax obligations of Daniel Andrus.
Daniel marshaled the findings by the court that Elizabeth is without

substantial cash and marshaled and tried to support his argument that he did not
have any substantial cash either. He cited that an examination of the evidence and
testimony contains no proof that he has any cash holdings.
Daniel marshaled and cited to the trial court record CR: 1681.
CONCLUSION
The evidence was properly marshaled. The first evidence marshaled by
Daniel Andrus was regarding the evidence that supported how the trial court foun
the facts from the evidence and second part of the evidence marshaled by Daniel
Andrus was regarding why such findings contradict the weight of the evidence.

Dated and signed this

of February 2007.
Respectfully Submitted,

)sprnona Blakelock
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

On this 22 day of February 2007,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing responsive brief, to:
Brent Young, 226, West 2230 North, Suite 210, Provo, Utah 84603
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BLACKPOOT, ID
Telephone (20g) 7SJ
Fa»aik(2Ml)7«5

E«M*ii — rabmi*w@s
November 9, 1999

GuyL Black
Greenwood & Black
1S40 North State Street
Provo, Utsh 84604
Re:

Andrus v. Andrus

De«r Mr. Black:
Although 1do not believe it i* necessary, Mr. Aixfroa is hereby requested to immediatety exercise the
options that you agree are due to my client This letter docs not waive my client's position and
assertion that she is entitled to additional options as set forth in her motion, and as additional options
as may be discovered. Thistetteris not a wwvcr of any right of Ms. Andrus, including her claim for
damages for Mr. Andna's decisions not to previously exercise his options pursuant to the Court
Order.
It is my understanding thai we arc exercising the stock option* for Grant Number 8405 ?S, granted
on December 30, 1992. My client's 25% of the 9,000 shares @ $8.50 comes to a total of
519,125,00, a check for that amount is enclosed herewith.
Sincerely,
BAKER & HARRIS

M. Harris
JMH/JG
cc.
Elizabeth Andrus
AJva Harris

;^AJ*DRU5\LIZ\»IYO*CTtfy^CE.5

ADDENDUM B

Authorization Form
Exchange of Stock Options
p Andrus
y undersigned optionee hereby makes the following election regarding the exchange of stock
options pursuant to the terms set forth in the letter dated July 1, 1997, from the Company:

Grant
Number

Grant
Date

Number of Shares
Outstanding

Exercise

Price

Exchange for New
Options

840575

12/30/92

9000

$8.50

No

849007

09/07/94

4000

$15,375

Yes

849361

09/07/94

2000

$15,375

Yes

852517

06/2/95

8000

$20.00

Yes

855146

03/01/96

0

$0.10

Yes

855256

03/01/96

30000

$12.1875

Yes

856420

04/10/96

6000

$13.5

Yes

860567

11/21/96

8000

$10.5

mSe*-&>

Please sign below to acknowledge
enclosures referenced therein and c
the terms and conditions of the Excj
thej^ew Grant(s) are not exercisabl
e that participation in the ej
'ag: em<bnt of emplayfeejit^th the
/lA^—
Signature of Optionee

dated July 1, 1997 and the.
, you agree to be bound by all o
Si said letter, and understand that
nature also acknowledges that
|stitute an express or implied
Will basis.
OremM-221
Location

Tue Jul 15 11:35:14 MDT 1997

801 222-4628

Date

Extension

